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COMPENSATION FOR LOST SERVICES OF AN EMPLOYEE – PURE ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE PER QUOD 
ACTION 
Under the common law an employer may take action against a defendant for the loss of an employee’s 
services due to the act of the defendant (per quod servitium amisit - by reason of which the services were 
lost).  The High Court has recently affirmed the existence of this ancient tort in Barclay v Penberthy [2012] 
HCA 40. 
Background 
Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd (Fugro) carried on the business of an air charter service for commercial 
purposes.  Penberthy was employed by Fugro as a pilot. Nautronix (Holdings) Pty Ltd (Nautronix) carried 
out the business of researching and developing marine technology. Nautronix chartered a plan from 
Fugro for testing equipment being developed for the use by the Royal Australian Navy and the United 
States Navy.  On 11 August 2003 the plane, piloted by Penberthy, took off with five Nautronix employees 
on board.  The plane crashed two minutes later, resulting in the death of two of the employees and injury 
to the pilot and the other three employees of Nautronix. 
It was established that the crash was due to the negligent design of a replacement part of the plane in 
2000 by Barclay, an aeronautical engineer, and the negligence of Penberthy in responding to the engine 
failure. 
At first instance Nautronix, the surviving employee passengers and the spouses of the deceased 
employees successfully sued Penberthy, and Fugro as his employer was held vicariously liable.  The claims 
against Barclay by the surviving employees were also successful, but Nautronix’s claim for the pure 
economic loss it had suffered from the negligence failed. 1 
On appeal it was held that Nautronix was owed a duty of care by Penberthy and Barclay in respect of the 
pure economic loss suffered from the loss of the services of its three injured employees, but could not 
recover for the loss resulting from the death of its two employees based upon the common law rule of 
Baker v Bolton (1808) 170 ER 1033.   
McLure P of the Court of Appeal reviewed the law in relation to per quod servitium amisit, stating:2  
Whilst the action for loss of services remains part of the common law of Australia, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that a negligent defendant must owe to an employer a common law duty to take reasonable 
care to avoid causing pure economic loss by injuring its employees. … 
 
The final issue of principle is whether [the employer’s] claim relating to the deaths of [the passengers] is 
defeated by what is known as the rule in Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493; (1808) 170 ER 1033. The rule is 
stated in terms that “[i]n a civil court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury”. 
That rule has been approved by the High Court: Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603; Agtrack (NT) 
Pty Ltd v Hatfi eld (2005) 223 CLR 251 [3]; Nguyen v Nguyen (1990) 169 CLR 245, 251–2; WorkCover 
Queensland v Amaca Pty Ltd (2010) 271 ALR 203 [34].  
… 
The rule in Baker v Bolton applies to both an action for loss of services and an action in negligence: 
Woolworths Ltd v Crotty (616); Swan v Williams (Demolition) Pty Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 172, 175–84. The New 
                                                          
1
 See Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316. 
2
 Fugro Spatial Soultions Pty Ltd v Cifuentes (2011) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-087 at [110]-[112]. 
South Wales Court of Appeal in Swan held that an action may not be brought at common law at the suit of 
an employer for damages caused by the negligently occasioned death of an employee. 
Special leave was sought to appeal to the High Court by Barclay, Penberthy and Fugro, and Nautronix 
sought leave to cross-appeal on the decision of the rule in Baker v Bolton (1808) 170 ER 1033. 
The issues that were considered by the High Court were: 
1. Whether Penberthy owed Nautronix a duty of care to avoid pure economic loss that flowed from 
the loss of services of its injured employees. 
2. Whether the rule in Baker v Bolton remained part of the Australian common law. 
3. Whether the action per quod servitium amisit existed under the Australian common law. 
4. What is the measure of damages in the action per quod servitium amisit? 
Duty to avoid pure economic loss to the employer 
The trial judge had found that Penberthy was liable for the pure economic loss suffered by Nautronix as 
he was aware of the purpose of the flight and that the surviving passengers were employees of the 
company. 3  However it was held that Barclay was not liable in negligence for the pure economic loss as 
he did not have the same knowledge of Nautronix as a party that would be affected by his lack of 
reasonable care.4 
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in the High Court agreed with the decision of the trial 
judge that Penberthy was liable in negligence to Nautronix:5 
 Communications between Nautronix and Fugro displayed an awareness by Fugro of the special 
nature of the charter services to be supplied.  The plane had to be modified for the equipment, 
the pilots employed by Fugro had to attend training and receive security clearance. 
 Penberthy therefore knew the purpose of the flight and knew that Nautronix was the employer of 
the passengers on the plane he was piloting. Therefore Penberthy knew that Nautronix was a 
commercial entity relying upon his care and skill as a pilot. 
 Nautronix was vulnerable as it was unable to protect itself from the foreseeable loss that would 
result from Penberthy’s negligence. 
Nautronix was said to be vulnerable as there was no evidence that ‘it could have negotiated successfully 
for the inclusion’ of an express term that required Fugro to accept liability for any loss suffered by 
Nautronix from injury to its employees (at [47]). Kiefel J accepted that it was not open to conclude that 
Nautronix could have made Fugro agree to accept such liability and that a duty of care was owed based 
upon that there was the implied term that Fugro would take reasonable care and knowledge on the part 
of Fugro of Nautronix (at [177]). 
In Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, 
Heydon and Hugh JJ), the fact that the party claiming pure economic loss was a commercial entity 
influenced the possibility that the appellant was vulnerable. In Woolcock, McHugh J stated that there 
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 Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316 at [346]. 
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 Cifuentes v Fugro Spatial Solutions Pty Ltd [2009] WASC 316 at [349]-[351]. 
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 As the damage was pure economic loss the principles of Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 
216 CLR 515 were held to be relevant: [2012] HCA 40 at [42]. 
were various avenues open to a purchaser of commercial premises to protect themselves.  Kirby J, in 
dissent, was of the opinion that ‘[v]ulnerability is not confined to cases of poverty, disability, social 
disadvantage or relative economic power as the majority suggest’.6  At [169] his Honour stated: 
I accept that the capacity of an entity to protect itself and its interests is an important factor in determining 
vulnerability. However, it is not the only one. In a commercial context there may be many more to be 
considered — assumption of risk, known reliance and commercial pressures, to name but a few. With the 
benefit of hindsight it is easy to suggest that an entity should have protected itself. However, courts should 
be reluctant to assume that a commercial entity lacked vulnerability simply because of its commercial 
character. 
The majority in Barclay v Penberthy was not influenced by the fact that Nautronix was a commercial 
entity in deciding that it was vulnerable.  However, Heydon J, in dissent, disagreed stating that it was for 
Nautronix to prove that it was vulnerable, and that the issue was whether there was ‘evidence that it 
could not have negotiated a warranty’ (at [87]) and referred to the similarity with Woolcock. 
Rule in Baker v Bolton 
In Baker v Bolton (1808) 170 ER 1033 it was held that a person had no cause of action in respect of the 
death of another. The joint judgment in Barclay v Penberthy noted that the effect of the common law rule 
had led to the enactment of the Lord Campbell’s legislation7  in 1846 to allow the dependants of a 
deceased to be compensated, but in other respects the rule had ‘remained unchanged’ (at [23]-[24]).  In 
the joint judgment it was held that any further modification of the ‘scope of the rule in Baker v Bolton is a 
matter for Australian legislatures’ (at [27]). 
Heydon and Kiefell JJ also held that the rule remained part of the Australian common law. 
Action of per quod  
It was argued that the action per quod was no longer part of Australian common law as it could be 
regarded as absorbed into the law of negligence.  Further it was raised that due to modern social and 
economic relations there was no rationalised basis for the action to continue to exist. 
In the joint judgment at [30] it was noted that the action provided compensation for the loss suffered by 
a master as a consequence of their servant being rendered incapable of performing their services if the 
defendant had either intentionally or negligently brought about the inability.  This reflected the notion 
that a servant was the property of their master.  In modern times the relationship between and master 
and servant is contractual, but as observed in Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Scott (1959) 102 CLR 
392 at 403 the per quod action was not be condemned as ‘out of keeping with modern social ideas and 
incongruous with the principles of our law as now understood’ (at [31]). 
Earlier decisions had identified the action per quod as an exception to the tort of negligence,8 but in 
Barclay v Penberthy it was held that it was not an exception and could be raised not only if the 
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 See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 24; Compensation to Relatives Act 1897 (NSW) s 3(1); Compensation (Fatal 
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defendant’s act towards the servant was negligent, but also if it was intentional and it did not require 
evidence of a breach of duty owed by the defendant to the master of the injured servant (at [35]). 
Therefore at [36] it was held that McLure P in the Court of Appeal had erred in stating that the existence 
of the action per quod was ‘directly relevant to whether it is reasonable to impose a duty of care in 
negligence’.9  
The per quod action is a separate and distinct action and has not been absorbed into the tort of 
negligence.  The majority held that it was for the legislatures to destroy the tort (at [37]). 
In respect of the argument that the tort has no place in modern society, it was noted that the tort had 
changed from protecting a master’s property in a servant to protecting the contractual interests and was 
therefore not based upon any legal fiction (at [40]).  Kiefel J at [131] examined the law and observed that 
the proprietary interest referred to the interst in the services not in the servant themselves.  In the joint 
judgment it was also pointed out that since the decision of Lumley v Gye10 the courts in the United States 
viewed a contract ‘as something in the nature of a property interest’ (at [39]).11  
At [52] of the joint judgment it was stated: 
There is no sufficient objection to Nautronix now relying on the action per quod to found liability against 
both Mr Barclay and Mr Penberthy. 
Therefore, liability existed as Barclay and Penberthy had been negligent in breaching their duties of care 
owed to the injured employees of Nautronix and as a result, as the employer, Nautronix suffered loss. 
Heydon J agreed with the majority that the action per quod  still existed at common law but Nautronix 
could not rely upon it before the High Court as it had not been raised at trial and if it had been evidence 
may have been given that ‘could possibly have prevented the action per quod servitium amisit from 
succeeding’ (at [97]). 
Measure of damages in the per quod action 
Nautronix claimed as loss ‘interruptions and delays in the development and testing of its marine 
technology and testing system and the loss of intellectual property and corporate knowledge’ (at [54]).  
Particulars of the loss suffered due to the injury of its three employees were not provided.  Nautronix 
argued that it was entitled to claim for all loss that was a direct consequence of the loss of the 
employees’ services, including consequential lost profits.  Reliance was placed upon the assessment of 
damages in the economic tort of inducing breach of contract as similar ‘quasi-proprietary rights of an 
employer with respect to the services of an employee’ are involved (at [160].12 Kiefel J held at [164]: 
Consistency with the purpose and scope of the action per quod servitium amisit requires that damages be 
limited to the cost of substitute labour. In Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1 at [67], it was observed 
that the employer suffers damage only when it is forced to pay a salary or wages to its injured employee 
when it is, at the same time, deprived of the employee's services. To permit recovery on any wider basis, 
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including for profits lost, would be to transform an exceptional remedy for a particular type of loss into a 
substantial exception to the general principles which have developed concerning recovery of economic loss 
in tort. In terms of the coherence of the law, that would be undesirable. 
Although the damages would be determined at trial of the remaining issues of the case, the principles of 
assessment were examined in the joint judgment at [56]-[59]: 
 Damages are assessed with reference to the consequences that follow from the loss of services 
and do not include all loss suffered merely because an employee was injured.13 
 The damage is assessed according to the market value of the services, that is, the cost of the 
substitute employee less the wages that are no longer being paid to the injured employee. 
 An employer is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss.14 
 Payments by an employer of sick pay or medical expenses that are required by statute, industrial 
awards or the terms of the employment contract, cannot be claimed as ‘these outgoing should be 
ascribed to that anterior obligation of the employer. They are not consequences which flow 
merely from the injury to the servant’ (at [59]).   
Conclusion 
The decision of Barclay v Penberthy confirms that an employer that suffers loss due to injury to its 
employee by a third party may be compensated even though the third party may not owe the employer a 
duty of care.  The action per quod, despite its historical origins, remains relevant in modern society as an 
employer has a contractual interest in the services of the employee.  However, the damages that may be 
claimed are limited and do not include all foreseeable loss that may result from the loss of services. 
It is also possible that a duty of care may be owed by the third party to the employer for the pure 
economic loss suffered if the salient features of such a novel duty as identified by the High Court in cases 
such as Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180, Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ (1976) 
136 CLR 529 and Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 can be satisfied. 
However, the law remains unchanged in respect of the inability of a party to recover loss that arises from 
the death of a person except as modified by statute. 
Amanda Stickley 
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